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AND THE COMMON GOOD
FREE SPEECH
MILTON CoNovER*

Walter Walker spoke to a select audience of one-his own little son.
But this personal speech proved to be too free in subject matter for
Walter Walker's own personal freedom in his own personal domicile
in his own Fifteenth Century England. For he dwelt in quaint Cheapside at the Sign of the Crown Tavern during the reign of Edward the
Fourth. He told his lively child that if he would be quiet, he would make
him heir of the Crown. Whether he meant the Crown Tavern or the
Crown of Edward the Fourth seems not to have engaged the court to
the extent of judicial notice. His few words so freely spoken caused him
to be "attaint of high treason and executed, tho Markham, Chief Justice, rather chose to leave his place, than assent to this latter judgment.",
The Chief Justice apparently opined that this judgment constituted
too great a limitation on speech to be in the public interest. Subsequent
to his leaving the court, other publicists through the three following
centuries made kindred demonstrations in favor of a greater freedom of
speech: Algernon Sidney, John Milton, John Wilkes et al. Consequently,
Nineteenth Century England enjoyed laws guaranteeing free speech
that were nearly as liberal as those of any country, while Nineteenth
Century America maintained free speech guaranteed in its Federal
Constitution and in each of its State Constitutions. By 1960, this meant
freedom for thousands of Walter Walkers in America to speak to audiences of continental scope involving millions of hearers. By this time
there were about 645,000 radio and television operators, and 700,000
radio licenses issued. There were about 200,000 associated mobile units
organized among fifty different classes of stations. Likewise there were
approximately 1,750,000 television receiving sets distributed over the
Continent.2 Microwave relay systems were planned from New York
to California. All of this besides the ordinary public speaking through
microphones, calliopes, loud speakers and mechanical devices.
With all of this multitudinous acceleration of audio-visual mechanics,
however, there still remained some limitations on free speech in the
public interest if we define "public interest" more broadly than did the
*Professor of Law, Seton Hall University.
1 1 HALE, THE HiSTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN, 115, (1778 edition); The
Walter Walker incident and some related data are substantially that used
by the writer in a consideration of "Limitations of Free SpeecV" in THE
SEaoN RFvmw, Vol. 1, p. 30 (1952). Since then, the
legal and extra-legal control of public audio-visual
community mores, much of which being Thomistic
the protection of the public good in the interest of
21949 FCC Ann. Rep. 41.
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Court of Edward IV, so that it be understood as the "common good"
in the St. Thomas Aquinas sense, especially where he senses that governmental "Actions are indeed concerned with particular matters: but
those particular matters are referable to the common good, not as to a
common genus or species, but as to a common final cause, according as
the common good is said to be the common end." 3 There were demands
for more laws "ordained to the Common Good," i.e., laws that were
ordinances "of reason for the Common Good, made by him who has
care of the community, and promulgated."
There were demands for further limitations on speech for reasons
other than treason. The mechanical age had expanded the public interest. By 1936, the United States Conference of Mayors had observed
the need of anti-noise ordinances. By 1942, the National Noise Abatement Council had noted that 165 American cities had enacted "Ordinances and other Measures for the Elimination of Unnecessary Noise."
This restraining program could be justified only in the interest of the
common good. Mr. Herbert C. Hoover, as Secretary of Commerce,
stated to the Fourth National Radio Conference, in 1925, that "The use
of a radio channel is justified only if there is a public benefit. The
dominant element for consideration in the radio field is, and always will
be, the great body of the listening public, millions in number, country
wide in distribution." This principle was adopted by the Conference,
which further considered that the broadcasting privilege, like public
utility privileges, should be based on convenience and necessity, combined with fitness and ability to serve, and due consideration should be
given to existing stations and services which they have established.
Later this idea was embodied in the Federal Radio Act of 1927.
By 1939, the Public Interest has become articulate "in accents disconsolate." The Federal Communications Commission found that about
fifty complaints a week were being registered against the radio programs. Complaints were made against radio talks concerning fortune
telling, solicitation for funds, astrology, indecent and obscene programs, political discussions, offensive religious or racial comments, and
thriller programs for the excitement of children in special children's
programs. Then, too, there were objections to false, fraudulent and
misleading advertising and to defamatory statements. These latter two
Part Second, First Part, Question 9, Article 2, translated by the Fathers of the English Dominican Province. (London: Burns,
Oates & Washbourne Ltd., 1927), p. 5. This volume includes St. Thomas'
Treatise on Law, Questions XC-CVIII, pp. 1-319. Volume 9, treats of Peace,
Discord, Contention and Sedition in Questions XXIX, XXXVII, XXXVIII,
and XLII, in the later of which St. Thomas declares that "it is evident that
the unity to which sedition is opposed is the unity of law and the common
good: whence it follows manifestly that sedition is opposed to justice and
the common good." Justice as such is treated more exhaustively in Volume 10,
Questions LVII-LXXIX, pages 104-350, but Volume 8 deals more especially
with the common good.

3 8 SUM MA THEOLOGICA,
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complaints might find remedy through personal action for criminal libel
or for damages-matters of private rather than of public interest. For
instance, by 1932, there were 2S States that allowed action for libel or
slander of dead persons-aside from common law actions. But the complaints concerning children's programs distinguished free speech from
the free press. Parents might keep objectional publications from their
children-but it was found difficult to keep them immune from offensive
radio programs. They had no chance to examine them before permitting
the children to hear them. The long line of existing precedents for freedom of the press furnished nice standards for freedom of speech, and
for its limitations, but they were insufficient for the new problems of
radio and television. Unprecedented controls were necessary. The speaker could have a charm for ill more effectively than could the printed
word. The original purpose of free speech was not to foster depravity
in children by either stories or the oral advertising of immoral commodities.
With expansive use of loud speakers and calliopes, there also came
assertion of the right to privacy and to silence, to domestic tranquility
and to protection of the nerves from plain noise labeled as free speech.
In Mr. Justice Brandeis' classic dissent in Ohnstead v. United States4
in 1928, he said that our Constitution makers "recognized the significance of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and his intellect. They
sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their sensations. They conferred, as against the Government,
the right to be let alone-the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men. To protect that right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be deemed a violation of
the Fourth Amendment."
If the Government may be restrained from intrusion upon personal
privacy-even when in search of evidence of crime-why may not loud
speakers be curbed from intrusion upon personal peace-the right to
silence? In the New Jersey case of Bednarik v. Bednarik,5 it was stated
that in the Roman law, "the punishment of one who had not committed
any assault upon another, or impeded in any way his right of locomotion,
but who merely attracted public attention to the other as he was pacing
along a public highway or standing upon his private grounds, evidence
the fact that the ancient law recognized that a person had a legal right
'to be let alone' so long as he was not interfering with the rights of
other individuals or of the public. This notion is the basis of our exercise of injunctive process in cases of private nuisance, resulting from
noise which interferes with the enjoyment of his home." The court
4227 U.S. 438 (1928).

518 N.J. Misc. 633 (1940).
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further recalled that "the reason for the punishment of eavesdroppers
and common scolds was not for the protection of property rights, but
the fact that their conduct was a disturbance of the right to quiet and
repose." Would not the same theory apply to loud speakers?
Synchronomously, new political fears had arisen that fostered greater
considerations for national safety. These were more like the Walter
Walker case. It centered on the rise of international Communism. It
was given expression in 1950 in a dissenting opinion of the United
States Supreme Court in the case of American Communications Association v. Douds.6 Here Mr. Justice Jackson, referring to the Communist Party, said that "It is a satrap party, which to the threat of civil
disorder, adds the threat of betrayal into alien hands. .

.

. In not one

of the countries it now dominates was the Communist Party chosen by
a free or contestable election, in not one can it be evicted by any election.
The international police state has crept over Eastern Europe by deception, coercion, coup d'etat, terrorism, and assassination." He considered
that the Communist Party in America was the same and that it "adds
occasional terroristic and threatening methods, such as picketing courts,
and juries, political strikes, and sabotage-conspiracy, violence, intimidation. . .

."

Prior to this case, some of the States had taken action

to curb expressions of Communist sympathy. The display of the Red
Flag was punishable in 32 States and there had been some prosecutions
for doing so. Anti-syndicalist statutes had been enacted extensively.
Teachers loyalty oaths had been required in several states-thus denying teachers the right to teach upon refusal to take such oaths. Profanity in speaking was prohibited in 36 States. In Washington, it was illegal
to speak disrespectfully of the law, and the law was upheld in the case
of State v. Fox.7 It was a crime in Vermont to defame a magistrate;
in Florida to upbraid a teacher in the presence of pupils. So public
order had enlisted defensive measures for the common good.
The idea of the common good had been refined in the 13th Century
through treatments of it in the various writings of St. Thomas Aquinas,
and after World War II it was cogent to the audio-visual spread in
compact communities of ranch-houses and housing projects in congested areas. Here too much free speech and free noise could disturb
domestic tranquility more disastrously than in the scattered ranchhouses on the great wide open plains devoid of captive audiences. "To
insure the well-being of a community," said St. Thomas in his De
Regimine Principum, "three things are necessary. In the first place the
community must be united in peaceful unity. In the second place, the
community, thus united, must be directed toward well-doing. For just
as a man could do no good if he were not an integral whole, so also a
6339 U.S. 382 (1950).
7

127 Fed. Rep. 1111 (1942).
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community of men which is disunited and at strife within itself, is
hampered in well-doing. Thirdly and finally, it is necessary that there
be, through the ruler's sagacity, a sufficiency of those material goods
which are indispensable to well-being." 8 This could include quiet housing projects. Rulers of countries are appointed "that they may prosper
the common welfare," wrote St. Thomas to the Duchess of Brabant in
De Regimine Judaeorumf Accordingly, in those matters "which concern the civil welfare, the temporal power should be obeyed rather than
the spiritual,"' 1° he averred in his Commentary on the Sentences of Peter
Lombard, allowing for exceptions. This community-centered polity was
to be implemented for the benefit of the individual person. For "life in
a community further enables man to achieve a plentitude of life; not
merely to exist, but to live fully, with all that is necessary to wellbeing,""1 he essayed in his Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics.
Among communities of people "there are different grades and orders,
the highest being the political community, which is so arranged as to
satisfy all the needs of human life; and which is, in consequence, the
most perfect," he observed in his Commentary on the Politics of Aristotle, and concluded that "The city is, in fact, the most important thing
constituted by human reason."1 2 Might it not also be the most important
thing constituted by human spirit if it could build a city as congenial
as the ideal city with which the Bible story culminates in the Book of
Revelation-with no captive audiences?
Abuse of official judicial speech also had invited restraint. On October 6, 1917, Senator Robert M. La Follette presented a press release
to the U.S. Senate stating that "Judge Walter T. Burns of the United
States district court in charging a Federal grand jury at the beginning
of the October term to-day, after calling by name Senators Stone of
Missouri, Hardwicke of Georgia and La Follette of Wisconsin, said:
"If I had a wish I would wish that you men had jurisdiction to return
an indictment against these men. They ought to be tried, promptly and
fairly, and I believe the court could administer the law fairly, but I
have a conviction as strong as life, that this country should stand them
up against an adobe wall tomorrow and give them what they deserve.
If any man deserves death, it is a traitor. I wish that I could pay for
the ammunition. I would like to attend the execution and if I were in
the firing squad I would not want to be the marksman who had the
3
blank shell."'
8 Chapter XV., translated by J.G. Dawson, in D'ENTREvEs, AQUINAS SELECTED
POLITICAL WRITINGS, (Oxford: Basil Blockwell) 81, (1954). Unless otherwise
indicated all of the words by St. Thomas Aquinas to which reference herein
is made are included in this volume to which page references are given.
9,
Ibid. p. 91.
10 Ibid. p. 187.
"I Ibid. p. 191.

Ibid. p. 197.

12
13 55

Congressional Record, 7878 (1917).
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This judge apparently disapproved of the six Senators and 50 Representatives in Congress who voted against America's entry into World
War I. But there was a suggestion from another Federal judge that
Judge Burns might well be investigated due to his official speech in
court.
In 1950, suggestions were rampant that investigations might well be
made of another Wisconsin Senator-Joseph R. McCarthy-because of
his liberty of Senatorial speech, which suggestions, however, became
less acid after the Soviet-the object of his antipathy-did terrorize
Hungary six years later and did mar summitry in 1960. More frivolous,
perhaps, were insinuations in 1951, that even some public expressions
of the President might be called to his attention for restraint or limitation in the World public interest. More serious was the suggestion in
1939, that Federal W.P.A. projects fostering alleged communistic sentiments should be curbed just as much as if they were produced by private
agencies, because the sovereign is not above the law. So the limitation
of free speech for the common good was to be no respector of persons
whether private or official. Characteristically, St. Thomas in his Sumina
Contra Gentiles had noted that "Lack of order arises from the fact that
somebody is in control, not because of his superior intelligence, but because he has seized power by physical violence or has been set up to
rule through ties of sensible affection." 14
Three theories of free speech merit attention in view of the MidTwentieth Century World situation: the Blackstone theory; the StoryCooley theory; and, the Use-Abuse theory. The Blackstone theory as
applied to the press would apply to free speech. Blackstone's liberty of
the press "consists in laying no previous restraints upon publication and
not in freedom from censure for criminal matter when published."15
Similar expressions appear in most State Constitutions in the United
States. Others carry expressions as in the First Amendment to the Federal Constitution. But Professor Zachariah Chafee, Jr., of Harvard Law
School, felt that the Blackstone theory "ought to be knocked on the head
once and for all."' 6 And it did seem impractical for radio speech and the
television. How could one prevent millions of children from being corrupted if there were no previous restraint-no prospectus of program
available to censors or licensors? In 1950, during the Korean police
action, should radio commentators looking for scoops have been allowed
to broadcast to the world the number of American troops that were to
be sent by airplane from San Francisco to Korea at a given zero hour?
As early as 1914 Professor John H. Wigmore warned that "the punishment of the picture-panderer, for abuse of his privilege, after he has
14 AQUINAS SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS, edited by A. P. D'Entreves, translated by J. G. Dawson, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell) 101 (1954).

15 BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, 151.
16 Chafee, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES, 9

(1946 ed.).
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done harm is futile and ill-judged. . . . Stop the exhibition; save the

rising generation; and thus prevent the harm before it is done. Such
would seem the sensible plan. We, therefore, hold that the ancient and
solid principles of liberty of speech, so far as it ignores our right to
prevent beforehand whatever we should be entitled to punish afterwards, may well be reconsidered.

' 17

The Story-Cooley theory is to the effect that anything that is not
injurious or harmful may be spoken freely. The injury or harm element
is the test. Justice Story's commentary on free speech holds that "every
man shall have a right to speak, write and print his opinion upon any subject whatsoever, without any previous restraint, so always that he does
not injure any other person in his rights, person, property or reputation;
and so always that he does not thereby disturb the public peace, or attempt to subvert the Government."'" Justice Cooley says that "we understand liberty of speech and of the press to imply not only liberty to
punish but complete immunity from legal censure and punishment for
the publication so long as it is not harmful in its character when tested
by such standards as the l.aw affords."' 9 This Story-Cooley theory would
seem to be adaptable to the 20th Century world situations and probably
to future circumstances-better at least than the Blackstone theory of
previous restraint. Story might allow previous restraint if necessary to
the public interest-where Blackstone's would not. The common good
as conceived by St. Thomas Aquinas, would be protected eventually
under either theory, however.
The Use-Abuse theory, or if you like, the Liberty vs. License theory
of free speech, is a further specification of the Story-Cooley standards
and it provides for evaluation of speech in terms of liberty or of license.
It was comprehended in 1900 in the Connecticut case of State vs.
McKee. 20 It asserts that "every citizen has an equal right to use his
mental endowments in any harmless occupation or manner, but he has
no right to use them so as to injure his fellow citizen or to endanger
the vital interest of society.

. .

. The liberty protected is not the right to

perpetrate acts of licentiousness or any act inconsistent with the peace
or safety of the state. Freedom of speech and of pen does not include
the abuse of the power of tongue or of pen, any more than freedom of
other action includes an injurious act of one's occupation, business, or
property." Hence the evaluation of injuries and social interests-the
common good. It would allow limitations very gracefully. As the'Supreme Court in 1918 said in Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United Statesbefore which there had been but few free speech cases judicially determined with extended theorizing-every "right, enjoyed in human
17

WIGMoRE,

Moving Pictures and the Constitution,9 ILL. LAW

18 STORY, COMMENTA IES ON THE CONSTITUTION, 1874.
19 COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 517-518 (6
20 73 Conn. 18, 46 A. 409 (1900).

ed.).

REV.

132 (1914).
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society is subject to the restraints which separate right from wrongdoing." Free speech gives no license to impose on the right to freedom
from annoyance. Likewise, in Frohwerk vs. United States,21 the Court
asserted that "we venture to believe that neither Hamilton nor Madison
nor any other competent person, then or later, ever supposed that to
make criminal the counselling of a murder-would be an unconstitutional interference with free speech." Likewise, Justice Holmes said in
Schenck vs. United States2 that "the most stringent protection of free
speech would not protect a man in falsely shouting fire in a theatre and
causing a panic." That would offend the common good. So to find a dead
line between free speech and abuse one might apply the formula of
Professor John G. Wigmore, thus:
A statute does not abridge constitutional freedom of speech
if it forbids A's exhortation of B to do a specific act which
would have consequences defined by the legislature to be deleterious to the commonwealth. But a statute does abridge such
freedom which forbids A's expression of opinion to B that a
specific act and its consequences ought not to be prevented by
in removing that
law, or forbids A's exhortation to B to join
23
legal obstacle by the usual legislative methods.
Professor Wigmore could apply his own test to his own position in
1898 when he opposed America's entry into a war with Spain, but once
having entered the war he would not hamper the war effort. Twenty years
later in Abrams vs. United States, the court in 1918 decided that to
attempt to induce residents of the United States to refuse aid in the
war effort of World War I constituted a punishable offense-an abuse
of freedom. There were two dissents: one by Mr. Justice Holmes who
had been wounded four times in the Civil War, and the other by Mr.
24

Justice Brandeis.

To determine where the right of free speech is abused to the detriment of the public interest, the courts have applied the "clear and present
danger test" as pronounced by Justice Holmes in 1919 in Schenck vs.
United States: "The question in every case is whether the words used
are used in such circumstances and of such a nature as to create a
clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils
that Congress has a right to prevent. It is a question of proximity and
degree." 2 Some jurists, however, consider that this test is inadequate.
Justice Brandeis, in the Whitney vs. California case in 1926 expressed
the difficulty that there was no standard "by which to determine when
a danger should be deemed clear."2 6 As regards danger to the Govern21249 U.S. 204 (1919).
22249 U.S.47 (1919).
2314 Ill.
556-557 (1920).
24250 U.S.616 (1919).
25 249 U.S.47 (1919).
26 274 U.S. 374 (1926).
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ment, the Supreme Court in Handen vs. Lowry declared that "the penalizing even of utterances of a defined character must find its justification in a reasonable apprehension to organized government.127 Under
this criterion, Walter Walker, under Edward IV, might not have been
executed. Also, in Bridges vs. State of California, the Court said that
"What finally emerges from the 'clear and present danger' cases is a
working principle that the substantive evil must be extremely serious
and the degree of imminence extremely high before utterances can be
punished." 28 This same criterion might be applied when any element
of the public interest is threatened as well as the organized government.
As Judge Learned Hand said as early as 1917 in one of the earliest
major American cases involving judicial discussion of liberty of expression: "Words are not only the key of permission, but the triggers
of action, and those which have no purport but to counsel the violation
of law cannot by any latitude of interpretation be a part of that public
29
opinion which is the final source of government in a democratic state.1
One week after the Schenck Case, which expressed the Clear and
Present Danger Test, the same Court adjudged that a speech by Eugene
Debs-a perennial candidate for the Presidency on a pacific Socialist
platform-was punishable by Federal imprisonment. The Abrams Case
was still standard.
Among the major cases scrutinizing the abuse of free speech that
have withstood the Clear and Present Danger Test, the Terminiello
Case 0 of 1949 seems to show some relaxation of the standard set in
the Abramns case. The alleged danger was to the public peace rather
than to the organized government. Here a Chicago Ordinance provided
that "all persons who shall make ...

any improper noise, riot, disturb-

ance, breach of the peace, or diversion tending to a breach of the peace
. . . shall be guilty of disorderly conduct." Under it, one Terminiello

had been convicted. The Court reversed the conviction by a 5 to 4 decision. Justice Douglas, speaking for the majority, said that "the statutory words 'breach of peace' were defined in instructions to the jury to
include speech that 'stirs the public to anger, invite dispute, brings about
a condition of unrest, or creates a disturbance.' ... That construction of
the ordinance is a ruling on a question of state law that is as binding on
us as though the precise words had been written into the ordinance."
Terminiello's words apparently were not a clear and present danger to
the peace because, as Justice Douglas declared, "a function of free
speech under our system of government is to invite dispute. It may indeed best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs people
27 310 U.S. 258 (1939).
28 249

U.S. 47, 52 (1919).

29 Masses
30 337

Pubf. Co. vs. Patten, 244 Fed. 535, 540 (1917).
U.S. 934 (1949).
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to anger." Free speech is "protected against censorship or punishment
when shown likely to produce a clear and present danger of a serious
substantive evil that rises far above public inconvenience, annoyance,
or unrest," and "there is no room under our Constitution for a more
restrictive view. For the alternative would lead to standardization of
ideas either by legislatures, courts, or dominant political groups." So
Justice Douglas was about as broad here as he was in Look Magazine
in January, 1951, re a T.V.A. for Iraq. His doctrine would seem to
throw the Court back to the Blackstone theory of no previous restraint.
For it would seem that "fighting words" may not be restrained before
the actual breach of peace thus relaxing the limitation noted in Cantwell
vs. Connecticut' 1 and in Chaplinsky vs. New Hampshire.n For Justice
Jackson in a dissent, showed that "fighting words" were used and that
there was a breach of peace according to American community standards
-outside of Chicago. There were 28 windows broken. These resulted
from agitation against the speaker Terminiello, and Justice Jackson
considered that the speech did induce a breach of the peace.
One of the greatest potential sources for the limitation of free speech
in the interest of the public weal is the State police power which is the
power to insure the common good against abuse. This has developed
steadily by implementation ever since 1827 when Chief Justice Marshall
in Brown vs. Maryland said that "the power to direct the removal of
gun powder is a branch of the police power, which unquestionably remains, and ought to remain with the States." Police power was judicially
considered in Commonwealth vs. Alger 33 in 1851 when Justice Shaw
said that "the power vested in the legislature by the Constitution, to
make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable
laws, statutes and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the Constitution, as they shall judge to be for the good and
welfare of the Commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same." This
mentioned serious words for the interpretation of courts and for the
appreciation of juries: wholesome, reasonable, welfare. But he was more
specific in his application of his standards to the use of property which
he opined is held by the owner "under the implied liability that his use
of it may be so regulated, that it shall not be injurious to the equal enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the rights of the community." This would be
applicable to loud speakers. "Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas." In
Atlantic Coast Line Ry. vs. Goldsboro, Justice Pitney recognized the
comparative constitutional position of the police power in saying that
"neither the 'contract' clause nor the 'due process' clause has the effect
1310 U.S. 296 (1939).
315 U.S.568 (1941).
33 61 Mass. 53, 85 (1851).
32
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of overriding the power of the State to establish all regulations that are
reasonably necessary to secure the health, safety, good order, comfort,
or general welfare of the community; that the power can neither be
abdicated nor bargained away, and is unalienable even by express
grant."3 4 So no future radio corporations nor aviation institutions
might buy the right to disturb the public comfort or the common good.
The Vermont Supreme Court expanded the idea so as to include "the
protection of the lives, limbs, health, comfort and quiet of all persons." 35
The "quiet" was important to Vermont. They were ready to control
loud speakers and nuisances. Later, other Courts recognized police
power as the right to protect morals. That prepared for radio and television control of programs. Eventually, public happiness and public welfare were considered attributes of the State which Federal government
could not violate. This all was quite aside from the Federal police power
which Justice Brandeis in 1919 thought extended to Federal subjects,'
and quite aside from the existing provisions of the common law-all of
which might be blended in support of the public weal against unwholesome noise.
Accordingly, the right to privacy in this machine age might include
the right to enjoy a quiet home which would be afforded only in a quiet
community. If so, the control of noisy speech would have for its auxiliary an old natural law principle. In Bednarik v. Bednarik, the New
Jersey Court in 1940 said that "the right of privacy in matters purely
private is derived from natural law" and that "The concept was developed under the Roman law whence it became incorporated in our Common law." The Court thought that "It seems strange that in none of
the reported cases has the constitutional right to personal privacy and
security been raised and debated. This inherent right is expressly secured
by all of the state constitutions, as well as by the Federal Constitution.
• .. The right of privacy has its foundation in the instincts of nature.
It is recognized intuitively, consciousness being the witness to prove its
existence." 37 "The natural law," the Court might have explained, according to St. Thomas, "is nothing else than the rational creature's participation of the eternal law. ' 38 Its function is to aid one in discerning
what is good and what is evil-the point beyond which a good may become an evil.
Where an attempt is made to limit free speech under the police
power the question whether a speech violates comfort or morals may be
3-1223 U.S. 548 (1911).
Vt. 149 (1854).
6Hamilton vs. Kentucky Distilleries and Warehouse Co., 251 U.S. 146 (1919).
3 18 N.J. Misc. 633 (1940).
38 8 SU MMA THEOLOGICA, Part II, First Part, Question 91, Article 2, translated
by Fathers of the English Dominican Province, (London: Bums, Oates &
Washbume Ltd.) 12 (1927).

3527
3
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a question for the jury and consequently the finding a bit unpredictable.
Some juries may be composed of lovers of rude comforts and of collective racket. In 1949, however, the case of Kovacs v. Cooper held that
sound trucks may be prohibited. Here a Trenton ordinance prohibited
the playing on the city streets-"any device known as a sound truck...
or any instrument of any kind which emits therefrom loud and raucous
noises and is attached to or upon any vehicle." The ordinance was challenged on free speech principles in the U.S. Supreme Court. The ordinance was upheld by a 5-4 decision, but the reasons for the decision
were about as various as the majority. So a clear cut doctrine as to
right to stir up a community's peace and quiet under the right of free
speech would still be welcomed. The theory of previous restraint entered
it, so did the element of time and place. Yet it was observed that "On
the business streets ...

such distraction would be dangerous to traffic

at all hours useful for the dissemination of information, and in the residential thoroughfares the quiet and tranquility so desirable for city
dwellers would likewise be at the mercy of an advocator of particular religion, social or political persuasions." 39 One needs only to spend a day
in some cities to feel the force of this statement-where one may not
escape anyone's amplified speeches or "music." Thus the common good
may be relative to the nature of a given community, unless the "good"
is identified with morals, rather than uncouth concepts of "good time."
This progress in judicial interpretation of the limitations on freedom
of speech was not universal. In some jurisdictions the Use-Abuse theory
had not prevailed always. Public speech and public demonstration had
been allowed to dominate a jury in the Leo Frank Case in 1915 in
Georgia. The United States Supreme Court decided not to remedy the
situation despite the dissent of Justices Holmes and Hughes, the dissent
asserting that the trial "was carried on in a court packed with spectators
and surrounded by a crowd outside all strongly hostile to the petitioner"
and "when the Solicitor General entered the Court he was greeted with
applause, stamping of feet and clapping of hands," and the judge privately told Leo Frank's counsel "that it would be safer for not only the
petitioner but his counsel to be absent from Court when the verdict was
brought in." 40 Eventually the jail was broken into and Leo Frank, the
Cornell University graduate, was lynched with less refined decorum
than was observed at the execution of Walter Walker in Fifteenth Century England. Lynchings followed in other states. Complaints were
audible that the right of free speech had been an obstacle in fixing
criminal or civil responsibility for defamation in some cases such as
Detroit Dailey Post v. McArthur,41 and that this sacred right had perU.S. 77 (1949).
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915).
41 16 Mich. 447 (1868).
39336
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mitted unjustifiable abuse of the judiciary in cases like that of In re
Hayes,42 and that it has rendered void a statute constituting public profanity an offense in State v. Warren.43 The courts need not have done
so. Under their own State Constitution courts could have sustained
almost any limitation of free speech within wide ranges of their police
power-which is the guardian of their own local public interests.
Both the Federal Congress and many State legislatures, however,
had been looking to greater control of public address. Professor Chafee
observed that the Federal statutes affecting freedom of speech applied
to words relating to treason, inviting to insurrection, interference with
the draft, inciting to mutiny, desertion, and threats to kill the President.
State statutes or the common law in states likewise restricted speech.
Legislation against incitement to violence obtained in eight states;
against conspiracy in 37; criminal syndicalism in 18; and against unlawful assembly in 42 commonwealths. Other less important limitations
prevailed. 44 Refinements and actualization of these legal theories, judicial precedents, and legislation were needed to cope with the Continentwide problem of public speech. This refinement became directed to radio
program control as regards its content, its relation to the feelings of the
people, the public morals and the public happiness.
This is afforded through a system of censorship, licensees, permits
and the enforcement of standards of service-policies and practices
offensive to the Blackstone theory. In 1940, in the Federal Communication Commission vs. Pottsville Broadcasting Company case, justice
Frankfurter said that "Congress moved under the spur of a widespread
fear that in the absence of governmental control the public interest
might be subordinated to monopolistic domination in the broadcast field.
To avoid this, Congress provided for a system of permits and licenses." 45
Three years later, the Supreme Court in the momentous Networks cases"
recognized and upheld the power of the Federal Communications Commission to regulate the standards of service and business practices of
radio networks. So the Blackstone theory had gotten its Chafeean
"knock on the head." The F.C.C. carried on its supervision of radio to
the extent that eventually all of the classified 50-complaints-a-week
against radio program content had been met by regulations or decisions.
They condemned some language as against public health and safety quite
as readily as if they had been exerting a State police power for a State.
They acted against a program used in advertising contraceptives. But
they did allow free speech concerning venereal diseases in deference to
4272

Fla. 558, 73 S. 362 (1916).

43113 N.C. 683, 18 S.E. 498 (1893).
44 CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN AMERICA,

572-77 (1946).
45 309 U.S. 134, 137 (1939).
46 National Broadcasting Co. v. United States (F.C.C.)
U.S. 190 (1943).

and other cases, 319
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the Federal Government's campaign against such diseases. Apparently,
the F.C.C. has followed precedent in limiting discussion where the interest of the common good of millions is concerned-following the UseAbuse doctrine of Schenck v. United States and of Abrams v. United
States of years long before. And in times of world emergency it may
be expected to shield the organized Government by following Gitlow v.
4
New York, 47 and Near v. Minnesota.

In post-war America, the State police power likewise was asserted.
In Pennsylvania in 1948, it was held that motion pictures included television in the case of PhiladelphiaRetail Dealers Assn. v. Pennsylvania
Liquor Control Board.4 9 Six states and many cities maintained motion
picture film censorship. The Pennsylvania State Board of Censors required censorship of reels for television for approval before public exhibition, thereby proceeding far from the Blackstone theory.
In both Federal and State censorship, after the advent of television,
there has been a trend toward the original purpose of free speech-free
speech as a means of protecting the common weal-not as a means of
pure commercialism with personal oppression. The elements of truth,
motives, and ends have been considered even as they were in State v.
Junkin when the Court said that "The privilege of speaking and publishing the truth with good motives and for justifiable ends was not
asserted in the Bill of Rights by accident." 50 The radio and television
are really more than free speech. Time may place its free speech relationships on the same level as labor picketing as analyzed by Justice
Douglas in the Bakery and Pastry Drivers Case in 1942, when he observed that "Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech,
since it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very presence
of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another, quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated." 51
In drafting policies for the control of free speech via mechanical
devices, legislators may resort to various means of limitations that are
purely incidental to free speech though none the less effective as to its
restraint. Such are zoning laws in which no loud speakers might intrude during certain hours, traffic regulations, and regulations common
to other enterprises. Radio corporations might be denied time because
their programs are of limited appeal. This is because the networks cannot meet the demand for time releases. So the authorities in the public
interest would grant time to operators having the greater number of
fans. Here the principle is comparable to that of public necessity and
convenience in public utilities-and to the economic law of supply and
47268 U.S. 652 (1925).
48283 U.S. 697 (1931).
.49360 Pa. 269, 62 A. 2d 53 (1948).
50 85 Neb. 1, 122 N.W. 473 (1909).

51 315 U.S. 769, 776 (1942).
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demand. This, of course, is quite aside from the matter of censorship
of program. It is strictly a limitation in the public interest from the
service motives. Too great a progress in such restraint might defeat
its objectives and the administration itself might be legislatively restrained. But further analysis of such policies would take us far from
the general theory of free speech law and into the technical routine
procedure of public administration. It is seen that this limitation of free
speech for the common good in the Thomist sense is a problem of perpetual balance between personal liberty and the public weal. There need
be no conflict between them. But should one over-balance the other, both
eventually could be lost. In this Urban Age of T.V.'s and super-megaphonics-five centuries after Walter Walker and King Edward the
Fourth-it often may be an increasingly complex question of both fact
and law as to what can maintain the necessary balance between the
rights of the Walter Walkers and the Sovereign Common Good.

